2016年考研《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》1月刊原文：世界經(jīng)濟(jì)

　　World economy

　　世界經(jīng)濟(jì)

　　Past and future tense

　　過(guò)去和未來(lái)時(shí)

　　The world economy in 2015 will carry troubling echoes of the late 1990s

　　世界經(jīng)濟(jì)在2015 年將出現(xiàn)20 世紀(jì)90 年代晚期令人煩惱的相似困境

　　A FINANCIAL crash in Russia; falling oil prices and a strong dollar; a new gold rush in Silicon Valley and a resurgent American economy; weakness in Germany and Japan; tumbling currencies in emerging markets from Brazil to Indonesia; an embattled Democrat in the White House. Is that a forecast of the world in 2015 or a portrait of the late 1990s?

　　俄羅斯發(fā)生了金融危機(jī);油價(jià)和強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元下跌;硅谷出現(xiàn)了新的淘金熱，并且美國(guó)實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇;德國(guó)和日本則經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟;從巴西到印度尼西亞的新興市場(chǎng)貨幣呈動(dòng)蕩;民主黨在白宮四面楚歌。那是對(duì)2015 年世界的預(yù)測(cè)或上世紀(jì)90 年代末的景象描繪?

　　Recent economic history has been so dominated by the credit crunch of 2008-09 that it is easy to forget what happened in the decades before. But looking back 15 years or so is instructive —in terms of both what to do and what to avoid.

　　近期的經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)由2008-09 年的信貸緊縮所主導(dǎo)，很容易忘記在十年前所發(fā)生的事情。但回過(guò)頭來(lái)看15 年前的經(jīng)濟(jì)會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)有所啟發(fā)—反觀兩者可以知道該做之事以及應(yīng)避免什么問(wèn)題。

　　Then, as now, the United States was in the vanguard of a disruptive digital revolution. The advent of the internet spawned a burst of innovation and euphoria about America's prospects. By 1999 GDP was rising by more than 4% a year, almost twice the rich-country average. Unemployment fell to 4%, a 30-year low. Foreign investors piled in, boosting both the dollar and share prices. The S&P 500 index rose to almost 30 times earnings; tech stocks went wild.

　　當(dāng)時(shí)和現(xiàn)在一樣，美國(guó)當(dāng)年是顛覆性的數(shù)字革命的先鋒?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)的出現(xiàn)催生了一陣對(duì)美國(guó)的前景創(chuàng)新和興高采烈的樂(lè)觀情緒。到1999 年為止，美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值每年增長(zhǎng)率超過(guò)4%，幾乎兩倍于富裕國(guó)家的平均水平。美國(guó)失業(yè)率下降至4%，為30 年最低點(diǎn)。外國(guó)投資者主要集中于提升美元和股票價(jià)格。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500 指數(shù)升至市盈率的近30 倍;科技股瘋狂飆升。

　　The optimism in America stood in stark contrast to gloom elsewhere, as it does today. Japan's economy had slipped into deflation in 1997. Germany was “the sick man of Europe”, its firms held back by rigid labour markets and other high costs. Emerging markets, having soared ahead, were in crisis: between 1997 and 1999 countries from Thailand to Brazil saw their currencies crash as foreign capital fled and dollar-denominated debts proved unpayable.

　　正如現(xiàn)今一樣，在美國(guó)的樂(lè)觀情緒和其他地方的悲觀狀態(tài)形成鮮明對(duì)比。日本經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)在1997 年陷入通貨緊縮。德國(guó)是那時(shí)的“歐洲病夫”，德國(guó)公司由勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)僵化以及其他高成本阻礙了經(jīng)濟(jì)。已經(jīng)提前高速發(fā)展的新興市場(chǎng)也陷入危機(jī)：1997 年至1999 年之間，從泰國(guó)到巴西等國(guó)家貨幣出現(xiàn)崩潰，并伴隨著外資外泄，而且以美元計(jì)價(jià)的債務(wù)被證明是無(wú)法償還的。

　　Eventually, America ran into trouble too. The tech-stock bubble burst in early 2000, prompting a broader share price slump. Business investment, particularly in technology, sank; and as share prices fell, consumers cut back. By early 2001 America, along with most of the rich world, had slipped into recession, albeit a mild one.

　　最終，美國(guó)也遇到了麻煩。早在2000 年科技股泡沫破滅，促使更廣泛的股價(jià)暴跌。商業(yè)投資，尤其是在技術(shù)方面的投資也在下降;而且隨著股票價(jià)格下跌，消費(fèi)者也在減少。到2001年初，美國(guó)與大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家一樣，已經(jīng)陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，盡管是溫和的下降。

　　America the powerful

　　壯哉美國(guó)

　　Inevitably the parallels are not perfect. The biggest difference is China, a bit-part player in 1999 and now the world's second-biggest economy, contributing disproportionately to global growth. But there are three trends at work that destabilised the world economy then and could do the same now.

　　不可避免的相似之處并不全然完美。最大的區(qū)別就是中國(guó)，一個(gè)在1999 年經(jīng)濟(jì)中扮演跑龍?zhí)椎呐浣堑闹袊?guó)，目前已經(jīng)是世界上第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)作出巨大貢獻(xiàn)。但也有使得當(dāng)時(shí)世界經(jīng)濟(jì)不穩(wěn)定三個(gè)趨勢(shì)，也會(huì)對(duì)現(xiàn)在經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生影響。

　　The first is the gap between America, where growth is accelerating, and almost everywhere else, where it is slowing. In the late 1990s Larry Summers, then the US deputy treasury secretary, warned that the world economy was “flying on one engine”. For 2015 The Economist's panel of forecasters expects 3% growth in America, compared with 1.1% in Japan and the euro area.China's growth rate may fall to around 7%.

　　第一個(gè)趨勢(shì)是美國(guó)，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)加快，而幾乎其他任何地方經(jīng)濟(jì)正出現(xiàn)放緩。在20 世紀(jì)90年代后期美國(guó)財(cái)政部副部長(zhǎng)拉里·薩默斯警告說(shuō)，世界經(jīng)濟(jì)是“依靠單臺(tái)引擎在飛馳”?！?a href='http://m.ivlnzgm.cn/kaoyan/jj/' target='_blank'>經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家》預(yù)測(cè)專(zhuān)家對(duì)于2015 年進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)：美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)3%，在日本和歐元區(qū)為1.1%。中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)速度可能回落至7%左右。

　　Americans can comfort themselves that, as in the late 1990s, the optimism gap is partially warranted. Jobs are being created in their country faster than at any time since 1999, cheap petrol has buoyed consumer spending and business investment has picked up. But the news is not all good: cheaper oil could tip plenty of America's shale producers into bankruptcy in 2015, while a stronger dollar and weakness abroad will hurt exporters —just as they did 15 years ago. Britain, the other Anglosphere champion, may also be clobbered by the euro zone's woes.

　　美國(guó)人可以安慰自己的是，在上世紀(jì)90 年代后期，樂(lè)觀缺口部分得到了填補(bǔ)和保障。1999年以來(lái)美國(guó)創(chuàng)造了比以往任何時(shí)候都要快的就業(yè)率，價(jià)格便宜的汽油提升了消費(fèi)者支出，并且商業(yè)投資回升。但并非全是喜訊：便宜的油可能會(huì)使得許多美國(guó)的頁(yè)巖生產(chǎn)商在2015 年破產(chǎn)，當(dāng)美元走強(qiáng)和外幣出現(xiàn)疲軟時(shí)會(huì)傷害出口商—和他們15 年前如出一轍。英國(guó)，其他盎格魯勢(shì)力范圍的捍衛(wèi)者，也可能被歐元區(qū)的危機(jī)重挫。

　　The second worrying parallel with the late 1990s is the dismal outlook for the rich world's two other big economies. Germany's growth rate has tumbled to around 1% and there is a deeper malaise caused by years of underinvestment, a disastrous energy policy and a government that is too obsessed by its fiscal targets to spend money and too frightened of its voters to push through the sort of structural reforms that Gerhard Schr?der implemented in 2003. Meanwhile Japan has repeated the error it made in 1997—thwarting its escape from stagnation with a premature rise in consumption tax.

　　上世紀(jì)90 年代末的第二個(gè)令人擔(dān)憂(yōu)的是世界上其他兩大經(jīng)濟(jì)體慘淡前景。德國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)率已經(jīng)下降到1%左右，多年投資不足導(dǎo)致更深的萎靡現(xiàn)象，災(zāi)難性的能源政策和政府過(guò)于迷戀其財(cái)政目標(biāo)來(lái)花費(fèi)金錢(qián)，太害怕選民對(duì)推動(dòng)政府進(jìn)行如格哈德·施羅德于2003 年實(shí)施的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革，同時(shí)日本已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)了1997 年所犯的錯(cuò)誤—挫敗了其逃離經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯與過(guò)早增加消費(fèi)稅。

　　The third echo of the 1990s is the danger in emerging markets. Back then the problem was fixed exchange rates and hefty foreign debt. Now the debts are lower, the exchange rates float and most governments have built up reserves. Still, there are growing signs of trouble, especially in Russia (see article). But other commodity exporters also look vulnerable, especially in Africa. Oil accounts for 95% of Nigeria's exports and 75% of its government revenue. Ghana has already gone to the IMF for support. In other countries the danger lies in the corporate sector. Many Brazilian firms are heavily indebted in dollars. A rash of corporate defaults may prove less spectacular than Asia's sovereign-debt crises in the 1990s, but they will make investors nervous and push up the dollar.

　　上世紀(jì)90 年代的第三波回音是新興市場(chǎng)的危險(xiǎn)。當(dāng)時(shí)的問(wèn)題是固定匯率和巨額外債?，F(xiàn)在，債務(wù)較低，匯率浮動(dòng)，大多數(shù)國(guó)家的政府都建立了儲(chǔ)備。不過(guò)，也有麻煩越來(lái)越多的跡象，尤其是在俄羅斯(見(jiàn)文章)。但其他大宗商品出口國(guó)也很脆弱，尤其是在非洲。石油占95%，尼日利亞的出口和政府財(cái)政收入的75%。加納已經(jīng)申請(qǐng)國(guó)際貨幣經(jīng)濟(jì)組織的支持。在其他國(guó)家的危險(xiǎn)存在于企業(yè)部門(mén)。許多巴西公司都對(duì)美元負(fù)債累累。一連串企業(yè)違約可能比亞洲的主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)在20 世紀(jì)90 年代不那么引人注目，但他們會(huì)讓投資者緊張，推升美元。

　　Fear the hangover

　　心有余悸

　　Add all this up and 2015 seems likely to be bumpy. Bears will bet that a surging dollar coupled with euro-zone torpor and a few emerging-market crises will eventually prompt a downturn in America. On the plus side, stockmarkets do not look as frothy as they did in the 1990s: the price/earnings ratio of the S&P 500 is 18, not far above its historical average. Although many big tech firms are investing recklessly, most have decent balance-sheets. And the global financial system is less leveraged and hence less vulnerable to contagion. In 1998 Russia's default felled LTCM, a big American hedge fund. Such knock-on effects are less likely today.

　　把所有這一切添加起來(lái)思考可以想見(jiàn)2015 年很可能是崎嶇不平的。大咖們會(huì)打賭，一個(gè)美元升值加上歐元區(qū)遲鈍和一些新興市場(chǎng)的危機(jī)最終會(huì)促使美國(guó)進(jìn)入經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)期。從有利的一面看，股市不會(huì)像他們?cè)谏鲜兰o(jì)90 年代那樣看起來(lái)像泡沫：在標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500 指數(shù)的價(jià)格收益比是18，而不是遠(yuǎn)高于歷史平均水平。盡管許多大型科技公司正在投資硬拼，最有體面的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表。與全球金融體系的杠桿率較低，因此不容易受到傳染。1998 年，俄羅斯對(duì)美國(guó)長(zhǎng)期資本管理公司(LTCM)發(fā)生了債務(wù)違約，這是一家大型美國(guó)對(duì)沖基金，結(jié)果致使該公司垮臺(tái)。這樣連鎖反應(yīng)是不太可能出現(xiàn)在今天。

　　But if the world economy does stumble, restoring stability will be harder this time round because policymakers have so little room for manoeuvre. Back in 1999 the Federal Reserve's policy rate was around 5%, leaving plenty of scope for cutting when the economy slowed. Nowadays interest rates all over the rich world are close to zero.

　　但是，如果世界經(jīng)濟(jì)不摔跟頭，恢復(fù)穩(wěn)定將在這一次變得更為困難，因?yàn)檎咧贫ㄕ哂心敲匆稽c(diǎn)回旋的余地。早在1999 年，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的政策利率是5%左右，經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩時(shí)留出足夠的余地去削減利率?，F(xiàn)在的利率都在富裕國(guó)家接近于零。

　　The political scene is also different, and not in a good way. At the end of the 1990s most people in the rich world had enjoyed the fruits of the boom: median American wages rose by 7.7% in real terms in 1995-2000. Since 2007, by contrast, they have been flat in America, and have fallen in Britain and much of the euro zone. All over the rich world voters are already grumpy with their governments, as polling numbers and their willingness to vote for protest parties show. If they are squeezed next year discontent will turn to anger. The economics of 2015 may look similar to the late 1990s, but the politics will probably be rather worse.

　　政壇出現(xiàn)了不利的變化。在20 世紀(jì)90 年代，大多數(shù)人在富裕世界的盡頭盡享繁榮的成果：美國(guó)中產(chǎn)階級(jí)工資在1995-2000 年實(shí)際上漲了7.7%。自2007 年以來(lái)，相比之下，美國(guó)工資增長(zhǎng)持平，英國(guó)和大部分歐元區(qū)工資甚至出現(xiàn)下降。各地富國(guó)選民已經(jīng)對(duì)他們的政府持不滿(mǎn)態(tài)度，正如民意測(cè)驗(yàn)記錄以及他們?cè)敢獍哑蓖督o抗議黨即可看出。如果他們被打壓，明年的不滿(mǎn)會(huì)變成憤怒。2015 年的經(jīng)濟(jì)可能類(lèi)似于20 世紀(jì)90 年代末，但政治形勢(shì)可能會(huì)相當(dāng)糟糕。